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HOMESTEAD, PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND WAGE
EXEMPTIONS IN MISSOURI AND IN OTHER STATES
PAUL D. HESS, JR.*
In view of the apparent cyclical trend towards another era in which
the debtor class may become disproportionately enlarged, it has been deemed
timely to examine some of the following items: the reasons for the existence
of homestead' and personal property exemptions; a comparison of the
types and extent of the exemption provisions applied in the other states;
an analysis of the Missouri law, as of the dates of the creation of the
exemptions and of the present, with regard to the present day applicability
of statutory form, and, in view of other factors and of more recent legisla-
tion, the necessity for such exemptions. The exemptions to be set forth
are of three types: that of the homestead, which normally encompasses a
tract of real estate with the buildings and appurtenances; that of varied
and numerous objects of personal property; and that of wage exemptions
-this last type being, except in the later consideration of state statutory
provisions, regarded herein as part of the personalty exemption.
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
There are various principles advanced as the ,bases of the homestead
laws, all of which tend to become highly diffused. It is said that the "home-
stead laws are founded upon ... public policy, their purpose being to promote
the stability and welfare of the state by encouraging property ownership
and independence on the part of the citizen, and by preserving a home where
the family may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of economic mis-
fortune.' '2 Their "... . purpose is to secure the home to the family even at
*Attorney, Macon A. B., 1941, LL.B., 1946, University of Missouri.
1. "The term 'homestead,' as used in law, embraces a variety of conceptions.
One of these is an immunity from the claims of creditors, which may continue after
the decease of the owner of the property embraced by the homestead exemption.
(This immunity is the type of homestead herein discussed.) Another is the restric-
tion of the conveyance or encumbrance of such property. Still another is a pro-
vision for the surviving spouse and minor children, out of a decedent's lands, whiclr
may or may not be property to which a homestead exemption has attached. ...
In yet another sense ... a homestead right is a right, based on residence and culti-
vation, to acquire a portion of the public lands of the United States, and the subject
of the right is termed a homestead." 26 AM. JuR., Homestead, § 1.
2. 26 Am. JUR., Homestead, § 6.
(21)
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the sacrifice of just demands, the preservation of the home being deemed
of paramount importance" 3 The incentive has not been one of charity,6
but to stimulate ". . . diligence and high morals, (and) ... also as a means
of enlisting the individual's self-interest in the preservation of established
rights and in the promotion of general prosperity."5 Although the theory
of the homestead and personal property exemptions is essentially the same,
".. the exemption in personal property is not in the nature of an estate in
the property analogous to the homestead right in land, but the debtor's
interest at all and if anything beyond a mere negative immunity from dis-
turbance under a particular writ is in the nature of a chattel interest."O
"In some jurisdictions the (personal property) exemption is regarded
as being allowed for the benefit of the debtor, while in others it is regarded
as being in the nature of a police regulation primarily for the benefit of the
community."7 One motive advanced is that in the settling of America there
developed ". .. a frontier philosophy that would throw a portion of the
risks of the struggle upon the creditor . . ,"s and secure debtors ". . . from
unjust and harassing litigation. . . ,,9 Another legislative desire was to "..
encourage industry and "thrift and the building up of homes by placing
beyond the reach of creditors such property as the debtor may require to
prosecute his labor or business, (and) ...no doubt it is better that some
creditor go unpaid than to take away from the debtor and his family that
which the lawmakers believe is essential for their education, culture, and
spiritual upbuilding."'10 Whatever theory is presented, "the protection 6f
the family from dependence and want is the expressed object of nearly all
the homestead and (personal property), exemption laws.""11
Prior to a compilation of the statutory, or in some instances-constitu-
tional, homestead and personalty exemption provisions of the other states
it was intended to submit charts of each type of exemption; it was discov-
ered, however, that the provisions are so varied as to preclude such an
approach. Of'the laws governing the homestead exemptions, it is the gen-
3. Ibid.
4. Keeline v. Sealy, 257 Mo. 498, 515, 165 S. W. 1088 (1914).
5. Note, State Homestead Exemption Laws (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1023, 1030.
6. 25 C. J. 8.
7. Ibid. See also 22 Am. JUR., Exemptions, § 4.
8. Vance, Homestead Exemption Laws (1932) VII ENCYC. Soc. SciENcEs 441.
9. 22 AM. JUR., Exemptions, § 4.
10. Ibid. Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 300 (validity of contractual stipulation
waiving debtor's exemption).
11. THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION LAWS (1878) 39.
[Vol. 12
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eral rule that such are limited to persons who are residents of the particular
state, who are heads of the family,' 2 and who own and occupy the realty
in question as the home. In some states there must be a written declara-
tion of the homestead right prior to any attempted execution, while in others
the right may be first asserted at the time of levy; and it will be noted that
some states have one comprehensive exemption, whereas others differentiate
between city and country homesteads. Also, in some states the provisions
for acreage and for value, of the land with. the dwelling house and appur-
tenances, are co-limiting, i.e., in Arkansas the country homestead cannot
exceed 160 acres nor exceed $2,500 in value, and thus if an alleged home-
stead consisted of 160 acres but was worth $3,000 the acreage would have to
be decreased to the value of $2,500;'- whereas in other states, as in Colo-
rado,' 4 the acreage or value is independent. Delaware, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Rhode Island have no homestead exemptions. In the following
listing the size is expressed in acres unless otherwise indicated.
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS IN OTHER STATES' 5
State Size Value Size Value Size Value
One Exemption Country City
Alabama* 160 $2,000
Arizona 4,000
Arkansas* 160 $2,500 1 $2,500
(not less than 80 acres in the country, nor less than acre in the
city, without regard to value)
12. Many states enumerate those persons who shall be deemed to be "heads
of families" or those who shall have the same rights, such as persons 60 years of
age. However, absent such specific provision, there were formerly raised such ques-
tions as-would the phrase include single persons, and male or female, supporting
others; or, a widow whose spouse was living at the time the exemption was claimed,
i.e., was her exempt status changed; or, a man divorced but paying alimony for
the support of previous wife and minor children? As might be anticipated, the
answers vary among the jurisdictions. In Missouri it has been held that the phrase
"head of a family" means one who controls, supervises, and manages the affairs
about the house, not necessarily a father or husband, Ridenour-Baker Grocery Co.
v. Monroe, 142 Mo. 165, 43 S. W. 633 (1897).
13. Conversely, if the alleged homestead consisted of 200 acres, worth only
$2,500, the excessive 40 acres would not be exempt.
14. Another possibility is shown by the case of Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218,
30 S. W. 1049 (1895), wherein improvements valued at $125,000 and placed on a
homestead were declared exempt, the provision being that the homestead shall not
exceed in value $5,000 "excluding the value of any improvements thereon."
15. The provisions in the states marked with an asterisk (*) are co-limiting.
The sources for the homestead exemptions are: ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 7, § 625;
ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) c. 24, § 501; AR DIGEST (Walter L. Pope, 1937) c. 83,
1947]
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State Size Value Size Value Size Value
One Exemption Country City
California 5,000




District of Columbia (none)
Florida 160
Georgia
"50 acres, and 5 additional acres for each child under 16; land shall
include dwelling house if house not exceed $200 ... provided that none
of the above land shall be within limits of city, and shall not include
cotton or wool factory... or other machinery over $200, and provided
that land is not used for other than agricultural purposes. Or, in lieu
of above land, real estate in city not exceeding $500."
Idaho $5,000




"An amount of property both real and personal . . . not over $1,000
is not liable for sale ... , provided that amount of real estate not exceed
$700, and provided that amount of personal property not exceed $600."
Iowa 40
§ § 7179, 7180; CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1941) 1260; CoLo. S. A. (1935) c. 93,
§ 23; CONN. G. S. (1930) § 5042; DEL. REV. CODE (1935) c. 133, § 4792; FLA. STAT.
(1941) § 222.01 and FLA. CONST. (1885) Art. X, Sec. 1; GA. CODE (1933) § 51-1301;
IDAHO CODE (1932) § 54-1001; ILL. REV. STAT. (1945) c. 52, § 1; IND. STAT.
ANN. (1933) § 2-3501; IowA CODE (1939) § § 10135-10137; KANS. GENL. STAT.
(1935) § 60-3501; Ky. Rzv. STAT. (2d ed., 1944) § 427.060; LA. CODE OF PiAC.
(Dart, 2d ed. ann., 1942) art. 645; ME. REv. STAT. (1944) c. 99, § 68; MD. ANN.
CODE (1939) art. 83, § 8; MAss. GENL. LAWS (1932) c. 188. § 1; MICH. COMp. LAws(1929) § 14608; MINN. STAT. (Mason's, 1927) § § 8336 and 8337; Miss. CODE ANN.
(1942) § § 318 and 320; MONT. REV. CODE (1935 § 6968; NEBR. REV. STAT. (1943)
§ 40-101; NEv. COMp. LAws (1929) § 3315; NEw HAMP. REv. LAW (1942) c. 260,
§ 1; NEw JERSEY REV. STAT. (1937) § 2.26-110; NEw MExico STAT. (1941) § 21-
601; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act (1926) § 671; N. C. GENL. STAT. (1934) § § 1-369
and 1-372; N. DAK. REV. CODE (1943) § 47-1801; OHIO REV. CODE (1936) § § 11730
and 11738; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 31, § 2; ORE. COMp. LAwS (1940) § 6-1302;
PA. STAT. (Purdon's, 1936) tit. 12 § § 2164 and 2166; S. C. CODE (1942) § 9085;
S. DAK. CODE (1939) § § 51.1701 and 51.1710; TENN. STAT. (Shannon, 1918) § 3798;
TEx. STAT. (Vernon's, 1936) § 3833; UTAH REV. STAT. (1933) § 38-0-1; VT. Pun.
LAw (1933) § 2559; VA. CODE (1936) § 6531; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933)
§ 552; WEST VA. CODE (1943) § 272.20; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) § § 89-2984 and
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State Size Value Size . Value Size Value
One Exemption Country City
(but if, in either case, its value is less than $500, size may be increased





Maryland 100 (of money, land or goods)
Massachusetts 800
Michigan* 40 $1,500 1 lot $1,500
Minnesota 80
(If within an incorporated place having 5,000 people or over, not ex-
ceed 1/3 of acre, and if within incorporated place having less than
5,000 people, not exceed /2 acre)
Mississippi" 160 3,000 3,000
Missouri* (see discussion, infra)
Montana* 320 2,500 2,500





New York* 1 lot 1,000
North Carolina 1,000
North Dakota* 160 2 $8,000
(as to the city homestead value, it is provided: "... not over $8,000
over and above liens or encumbrances, or both .
Ohio 1,000
(Further provided that a husband and wife living together and not
owner of homestead, in lieu thereof, may hold exempt real or personal
property up to $500, in addition to amount of chattel property otherwise
exempted)
Oklahoma* 160 $3,000 1 5,000
(as to the city homestead, it cannot be reduced to under acre, with-
out regard to its value)
Oregon 160 3,000 i block 3,000
Pennsylvania 300




South Dakota 160 1
1947]
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State Size Value Size Value Size Value
One Exemption Country City
(Also provided: "If the homestead is claimed upon any land, the title
or right of possession of which was acquired under the laws of the
United States, relating to mineral lands, then the area, if within town
plat, cannot exceed 1 acre, and if without town plat cannot exceed 40
acres, if title has been acquired as a placer claim, but if the title has
been acquired under the Laws of Congress as a lode mining claim, the




'(The homestead of the $2,000 valuation is for the head of the family,
it being provided for a further exemption of $750 for the spouse and
$300 for each other member of the family.)
Vermont 1,000
Virginia 2,000
(or in lieu of the homestead, $2,000 worth of personal property may
be selected as exempt, in addition to the otherwise exempt chattels)
Washington 2,000
West Virginia 1,000
Wisconsin* 40 $5,000 $5,000
Wyoming 2,500
The variance in the sizes and values of the homestead exemptions is in-
teresting to note, and may be attributed at least in part to such factors as the
dates of the passing of the provisions in relation to the then existing stage
of state or national development, the economic era of prosperity or depres-
sion, or the then predominate social groups; the physical nature of the state;
the financial and educational backgrounds of the members of the various
legislatures; and most probably the presence or absence of political pressure
groups.
PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
In next considering the personal property exemptions, the types
of provisions may be classified into two major groups: (1) those very few
which briefly place a monetary limitation upon any personalty which the
debtor selects for his exemption, and (2) those which set forth at length,
with or without monetary limitations, the specific articles which may or
shall be exempt-this listing in a large majority of the states being quite
[Vol. 12
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detailed. The following states16 are those which fall within the first group-
ing: Alabama, $1,000 plus all necessary wearing- apparel, portraits and pic-
tures, and all books used in the family; Arkansas, wearing apparel, plus $500
if head of a family, or plus $200 if not head of a family; Florida, $1,000
worth of personal property as desired; Indiana, not to exceed $600;1" New
Jersey, $200 plus all wearing apparel; North Carolina, $500; South Carolina,
$500 if head of a family, and if not head of a family the necessary wearing
apparel, and tools and implements of trade, up to $300; West Virginia, $200
if head of a family, and, any mechanic, artisan, or laborer, whether he be
husband or parent or not, the working tools of his trade up to $50. One
state, though falling within the second grouping, is individually noteworthy
because its provisions vary in application among its counties; however, as
there are but three counties in this state, Delaware,.8 the difficulty of appli-
cation is not so great as might be anticipated.
The second grouping includes those states not mentioned above and
will be dealt with generally, because in most of them the provisions are very
similar, the differences being those of width of coverage and, where the
widths are comparable, of the extent of itemization. One statute, that of
the State of Washington,. is quite typical, the personal property exemp-
tion consisting of:
16. The sources for the state personal property exemptions listed within this
grouping are: ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 7, § 629; ARK. DIGEST (Walter L. Pope, 1937)
c. 83, 83, § § 7183 and 7184; FLA. STAT. (1941) § 222.06 and FLA. CONST. (1885)
Art. X, Sec, 1; IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 2-3501; NEW JERSEY REv. STAT. (1937)§ 2:26-99; N. C. GENL. STAT. (1943) § 1-378; S. C. CODE (1942) § 9090; WEST VA.
CODE (1943) § 3897.
17. Indiana's provision is singular in that it provides as follows: an amount
of property both real and personal of any resident householder not over $1,000 owned
by the householder is not liable for sale, provided that the amount of real estate does
not exceed $700, and provided that the amount of personal property does not exceed
$600.
18. Delaware differentiates among its counties of New Castle, Sussex and
Kent as follows: a Bible, school books and family library, pew in place of worship,
all wearing apparel, and tools for carrying on business, not to exceed $75 in New
Castle and Sussex counties and $50 in Kent county. And, in another section, it is
stated that every person in New Castle and Kent counties, being head of a family,
is also exempt for other personal property up to $200 in New Castle county and
$50 in Kent county, this latter section specifically not applying to Sussex county.
DEL. REv. CODE (1953) c. 133, § § 4793 and 4794.
19. WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) § 563. The sources for the state per-
sonal property exemptions not previously presented are as follows those states which
'have several sections setting forth the exemptions will be indicated appropriately, but
with only the initial section cited. ARiz. CODE ANN. (1939) § 24-601; CAL. Ciy. CODE
(Civ. Proc., Deering, 1941) § 690.1 et seq.; CoLo. S. A. (1935) c. 93, § 13 et seq.;
CONN. GENL. STAT. (1930) § 5791; D. C. CODE (1940) § 15-401; GA. CODE (1933)§ 51-1301; IDAHO CODE (1932) tit. 8, § 204; ILL. REV. STAT. (1945) c. 52, § 13;
7
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(1) all wearing apparel of every person and family; (2) all
private libraries, up to $500 and all family pictures and keepsakes;
(3) to each householder, 1 bed and bedding and 1 additional bed
and bedding for each additional member of the family, and other
household goods and utensils and furniture up to $500; (4) to each
householder, 2 cows with their calves, 5 swine, 2 stands of bees,
36 domestic fowls, and provisions and fuel for comfortable mainten-
ance for householder and family for 6 months, and feed for animals
for 6 months, provided, that in case householder does not have or
desire the animals, he may select from other property up to $250;
(5) to a farmer, 1 span of horses or mules, with harness, or 2 yoke
of oxen, and 1 wagon; also farming utensils actually used up to
$500; also 150 bushels of wheat, 150 bushels of oats or barley, 50
bushels of potatoes, 10 bushels of corn, 10 bushels of peas, and 10
bushels of onions for seeding purposes; (6) to a mechanic, tools
and instruments to carry on a trade for support of himslf and
family, and material used in his trade up to $500; (7) to a physician,
his library up to $500; also 1 horse, with harness and buggy, instru-
ments used in practice, and medicines up to $200; (8) to attorneys,
clergymen and other professional men, libraries up to $1,000; also
office furniture, fuel and stationery up to $200; (9) all firearms
kept for the use of any person or family; (10) to any person, a
canoe, skiff or small boat, with oars, sails, and rigging up to $250;
(11) to a person engaged in lightering for support of self or family,
one or more lighters, barges, etc., and a small boat, with oars, up
to $250; (12) to a teamster or drayman in that business for support
of self or family, his team, consisting of 1 span of horses, or mules,
with harness, yoke, 1 wagon, truck, cart, or dray; (13) to a person
engaged in logging business for support of self or family, 3 yoke
of work cattle and yokes, and axes, chains, and other camp equip-
ment up to $300; (14) sufficient quantity of hay or feed to keep
the animals mentioned alive for 6 months.
IOWA CODE (1939) § 11760 et seq.; KANS. GENL. STAT. (1935) § 60-3505; Ky. REv.
STAT. (2d ed., 1944) § 427.010 et sq.; LA. CODE OF PRAC. (Dart, 2d ed. ann., 1942)
art. 644; ME. REv. STAT. (1944) c. 99, § 67; Mv. ANN. CODE (1939) art. 83, § 11;
MASS. GENL. LAWS (1932) c. 235, § 34; MicH. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 16179; MINN.
STAT. (Mason's, 1927) § 9447; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) § 307; MONT. REV. CODE
(1935) § 9427 et seq.; NEBR. REV. STAT. (1943) § 25-1556; NEV. COMP. LAWS (Supp.,
1941) § 8844; NEW HAMP. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 412, § 21; NEW MExIco STAT.
(1941) § 21-501 et seq.; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1926) § 665; N. DAK. REv. CODE
(1943) § 28-2202 et seq.; OHIO REv. CODE (1936) § § 11721 and 11725; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. (1937) tit. 31, § 1; ORE. COMP. LAWS (1940) § 6-1201: PA. STAT. (Purdon's,
1936) tit. 12, § 2167 et seq.; R. I. GENL. LAWS (1938) c. 557, § 1: S. DAK. CODE
(1939) § 51.1802 et seq.; TENN. STAT. (Shannon, 1918) § 3794, TEx. STAT. (Vernon's,
1936) § 3812; UTAH REV. STAT. (1933) § 104-37-13; VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) § 2250;
VA. CODE (1936) § 6552 et seq.; Wisc. STAT. (1943) § 272.18; Wyo. REv. STAT.
(1931) § 89-2990 et seq.
[Vol. 12
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Other articles which are within the listings of most of the state statutes
are a Bible, burial site, seat in house of public worship, loom and spinning
wheel, and arms of militiamen; in many states are provisions for sewing
machines, watches, typewriters, and bicycles. Yet the most noteworthy
differences are those exemptions applicable to only one or a few states and
which are indicative of the importance of local personal necessities or certain
fields of work; herein are included prospectors' outfits in Arizona; nautical
instruments and apparel in California; cabins and sluices of miner in Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Montana and Nevada; printing press, types, material and
newspaper office in Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota and Utah; all
anthracite coal up to 5 tons, all bituminous coal up to 50 bushels, and $50
worth of lumber, wood or bark in Maine; boats, fishing tackle and nets in
Maine and Massachusetts; a sleigh in Minnesota; a molasses mill and
equipments in Mississippi; specimens and cabinets of natural history or
science, whether animal, vegetable or mineral, except such as may be
intended for show or exhibition for money or pecuniary gain in New Mexico;
a ferry boat in Texas; and concerning pets, the provisions range from 1 dog,
in Texas, to, in Virginia, all cats, dogs, birds, squirrels, rabbits, and other
pets not kept for sale. The most specific listing of relatively modern farming
machinery is in Wisconsin, which, in addition to other items, exempts one
of each of the following: binder, corn binder, mower, spring-tooth harrow,
disc harrow, seeder, hay loader, and corn planter. Only four states, Cali-
fornia, Michigan, Montana, and Nevada, specifically provide for the exemp-
tion, under certain conditions, of a motor vehicle, although other states
have so provided through statutory construction.20
The problems of interpretation which are common to the personal
property exemptions are several. Again, it must be decided as to what
conditions are necessary that one constitute the "head of the family"; and
the next most confusing question has been the" meaning of "necessary",
when used in conjunction with the phrases wearing apparel or tools of a
person's trade or business. Further, what is the context of "tools", "tools
and implements", or "tools, implements, and instruments", as these phrases
are used to exempt such of the mechanic or laborer? What items are included
20. However, other states have also exempted automobiles through the process
of statutory construction-Iowa and Texas (where the statute exempted a mule and
a carriage and the court had already held that a mule could mean a horse, the court
then later reasoned that "if a mule is a horse, undoubtedly an automobile is a car-
riage"); note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 74.
1947]
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under "furniture", "libraries", or "farming utensils"? May an expensive
ring or watch be withheld as being included under "wearing apparel", or
must such be specifically mentioned in the statute -? 2 1 If a person works at
different occupations, may he have exempt the tools or instruments of each
occupation or only of that which is considered to be his primary occupation?22
If a farmer engages in greatly diversified types of agriculture, is his equip-
ment for each type protected or only for that type which yields the major
part of his income?23 Who are "mechanics"?'Tbe answers to these questions
of necessity change with the wording of the statutes, the judicially con-
strued legislative intent, the item concerned, the attitude of the court,
and of course the manner in which the case arises; thus, absent any attempt
to set forth general "rules", some of the answers given by the courts to
the above questions will be presented.
The word "necessary", as applied to household furniture," . . . while it
excludes superfluities and articles of luxury, was not intended to denote
those articles of furniture which are indispensable to the bare subsistence
of the debtor and his family, but embraces those things which are requisite
to enable the debtor and his family to live in a convenient and comfortable
manner. ' 24 However, such application of the term as here suggested is
not possible where the statute also imposes a monetary limitation, in which
case the exempt furniture might not include even those "indispensable"
items.25 Although the scope of "tools and implements" is limited by some
jurisdictions to ". . . some simple instrument used by hand ..."2" still "...
the mere fact that tools claimed as exempt are expensive does not defeat
the claim, if they are in fact tools as distinguished from machinery."27 It
seems desirable that whether a particular chattel is exempt as a tool of the
owner's occupation should be a mixed question of law and fact,28 for "at
present, when the application of motive power to the operation of what
formerly were hand tools as a matter of common, everyday practice, it
21. New York specifically exempts a wedding ring, and, a watch not to ex-
ceed $35 in value; N. Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT (1926) § 665.
22. The better view seems to be that the debtor may have as exempt the tools
or instruments of each- occupation which he follows; this question is discussed in
Note (1928) 52 A. L. R. 826.
23. Here also it seems proper that the farmer should be allowed the implements
of each type of his agricultural pursuits; see Note (1928) 52 A. L. R. 826.
24. THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAws (1878) 636; see also 22
Aa'x. JUR., Exemptions, § 49.
25. 22 AM. JUR., Exemptions, § 49.
26. THoMPSON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 614.
27. 25 C. J. 50.
28. Note (1919) 2 A. L. R. 826.
[Vol. 12
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1947], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/8
HOMESTEAD, WAGE EXEMPTIONS
cannot be said that propulsion by power per se excludes an implement from
the exemption which the statute would otherwise afford. '29 With regard
to farming utensils, "the implements of husbandry which are exempt are
ordinarily those which are used by the farmer in conducting his own farm-
ing operations, and such tools or implements as he keeps for renting or
hiring out are usually not exempt." 8° In applying the term "mechanic,"
it ".... has sometimes been given a limited meaning as applying only to
a skilled workman employed in shaping materials, such as wood, metal, or
stone, into some kind of a structure or machine or other object requiring
the use of tools, but the prevailing tendency is to broaden and enlarge the
scope of the word. Thus it has been defined as one who works with machines
or instruments and has been coristrued as including a baker, barber, a
dentist, a master workman, a tailor, and others."'"
WAGE EXEMPTIONS
The last type of exemption to be considered is that of certain sums
or percentages of wages and salaries, and some states set up the exemption
on the basis of any earnings within a specified time. In connection with
the following listing it must be noted that most states have provisions for
decreasing the exemption allowed when the indebtedness is due to the pur-
chase of necessaries-only a few of such states being indicated; also, the
majority of states restrict the wage exemption to "heads of families", or
sometimes a smaller exemption is provided for persons without dependents.
State 2  Amount Stated Percentage Miscellaneous Factors
Alabama $25 monthly
Arizona 2 for services rendered within 30 days
Arkansas* last 60 days
California 32 for services rendered within 30 days,
if such Y2 is necessary; all, if necessary
for resident family
29. 22 AM. JuR., Exemptions, § 41; this discussion further states that "the test
of whether a tool, implement, or instrument is exempt is its adaptability to use in
the trade or occupation of the debtor, rather than its size or value." However, many
courts will not permit the unrestricted application of this test.
30. Id. § 42. Notes (1928) 52 A. L. 826 and (1925) 36 A. L. R. 669 (what
are tools, implements, utensils, or apparatus?).
31. 22 AM. JuiL, Exemptions, § 26.
32. The states indicated with an asterisk (*) restrict the exemptions to cer-
tain classes of workers. The sources of the state wage exemptions are: ALA. CODE
1947]
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State Amount Stated Percentage Miscellaneous Factors
Connecticut $15
Delaware 90%, for people in New Castle County
60%, for people in Kent and Sussex
counties
D. C. $100 monthly, for two months preceding
Florida
("no writ of attachment or garnishment or other process shall issue from
any of the courts of this state to attach or delay the payment of any
money or other thing due to any person who is the head of a family
* residing in this state, when the money or other thing is due for the
personal labor or services of such person")
Georgia $1.25 per day of daily, weekly, or monthly wages, and 50%
of excess thereof
75% earned within 30 days, but not to
exceed $100
Kentucky 90% of person earning $75 or less monthly
Illinois $25 weekly, if on payroll, exclusive of payroll deductions;
if on commission, $20
Indiana' $25, so long as employee remains in such employment
Iowa last 90 days
Kansas
(10% and court costs not over $4 may be taken by garnishment, if
remainder proven to be necessary for family maintenance; if debtor
is sick, garnishment not permitted for two months after recovery)
(1940) tit. 7, § 630; ArIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) c. 25, § 217; ARK. DIGEST (Walter L.
Pope, 1937) c. 83, § 7185; CAL. CIV. CODE (Civ. Proc., Deering, 1941) § 690.11;
CoLO. S. A. (1935) c. 93, § 16; CONN. GENL. STAT. (1930) § 5793); DEL. REV. CODE
(1935) c. 133, § 4804; D. C. CODE (1940) § 15-403; FLA. STAT. (1941) § 222.11;
GA. CODE (1933) § 46-208; IDAHO CODE (1932) § 8-204; ILL. REV. STAT. (1945) c.
62, § 14; IND. ANN. STAT. (1933) § 3-505; IOWA CODE (1939) § 11763; KANS. GENL.
STAT. (1935) § 60-3495; Ky. REV. STAT. (2d ed., 1944) § 4427.010; LA. CODE or
PRAc. (Dart, 2d ed. ann., 1942) art. 644; ME. REV. STAT. (1944) c. 101, § 55; MD.
ANN. CODE (1939) art. 9, § 33; MASS. GENL. LAWS (1932) c. 246, § 28; MICH. Comp.
LAWS (1929) § 16179; MINN. STAT. (Mason's, 1927) § 9447; Miss. CODE ANN.
(1942) § 307; MONT. REV. CODE (1935) § 9429; NEBR. Rrv. STAT. (1943) § 25-1558;
NEV. CoMP. LAws (Supp., 1941) 8844; NEW HAMP. REV. LAWS (1942) c. 412, 21;
NEW JERSEY REV. STAT. (1937) § 2:26-183; NEw MExico STAT. (1941) § § 21-501,
21-607, 22-227; N. Y. Civ. PP.Ac. AcT (Justice Ct., 1926) § 300; N. C. GENL. STAT.
(1943 § 1-362; N. DAK. REV. CODE (1943) § 32-0902; OHIo REV. CODE (1936)
§ § 11725 and 11721; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 31, § § 1 and 4: ORE. CoMp. LAW
(1940) § 6-1202; PA. STAT. (Purdon's, 1936) tit. 42, § 886; R. I. GENL. LAWS (1938)
c. 557, § 1; S. C. CODE (1942) § 750; S. DAK. CODE (1939) § § 37.2807 and 37.5001;
TENN. STAT. (Shannon, 1918) § 3795a3; TEx. STAT. (Vernon's. 1936) § 3832; UTAH
REV. STAT. (1933) § 104-37-13; VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) § 1754; VA. CODE (1936)
6555; WAsI. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1933) § 703; WEST VA. CODE (1943) § 3834
(3); Wisc. STAT. (1943) § 272.18; Wyo. REV. STAT. (1931) § 89-3125.
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90%o of person earning $75 or less monthly
$77.50 of person earning more than $75 monthly
80%, but a minimum of $60 always exempt
("no person shall be adjudged a trustee . .. by reason of any amount
due from him to the principal defendant, as wages for his personal
labor, or that of his wife or minor children, for a time not exceeding
one month next preceding the service of process, and not exceeding $20
of the amount due and payable to him as wages for his personal labor;
and $10 shall be exempt in all cases ......
Maryland $100
Massacchusetts $20, though only $10 if wages attached for necessaries
Michigan
(amounts stated range from $50 to $4 and percentages range from 60%
to 30%, there being several categories, dependent upon length of time
during which the work was done)
Minnesota $35 for 30 day period
Mississippi $50
Missouri (see footnote no. 36, infra)
Montana last 45 days if necessary
for family use
Ohio 80% of first $200 and 60% of balance
Nevada last 30 days if needed
for family
New Hampshire $20, though only $10 if wages attached for necessaries
New Jersey
(execution may issue upon wages not to exceed 10%, unless the income
of debtor exceeds $1,000 per annum, in which case the judge may
order a larger percentage)
New Mexico3 3  last 60 days if necessary
for support
New York
(where wages due debtor are to the amount of $12 or more per week,
execution shall become lien thereon not to exceed 10%o thereof)
33. Two of the New Mexico provisions must be jointly considered; one section
says that no person shall be charged as garnishee for more thari 20% of wages due
debtor for last 30 days, unless the wages exceed $75, in which case the creditor can
garnish for the 20% of $75 and all earned over $75 monthly; another section states
as exempt the personal earnings of the debtor for the last 60 days when it appears
that such earnings are necessary for family support; NEw MEXICO STAT. (1941)
§ § 22-227 and 21-501. Note (1930) 65 A. L. R. 1283 (issuance of successive writs
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State Amount Stated Percentage Miscellaneous Factors
North Carolina
North Dakota $20 weekly
Ohio
last 60 days if necessary
for family use
80% of first $200 and 60%o of balance
of earnings for last 30 days, but
not under $60
Oklahoma 75% earned within 90 days
Oregon $75 earned within 30 days
Pennsylvania
("the wages of any laborer, or the salary of any person in public or
private employment shall not be liable to attachment in the hands
of the employer")
Rhode Island $10
South Carolina last 60 days if necessary
for family use
South Dakota
(evidently regarded as being covered by the liberal personal property
exemption provisions)




earning more than $40 monthly
all current wages
1 earned within 30 days if necessary for
family; though if earned $20 a day or
less, then entitled to $30
Vermont 90%




(complicated provisions for computing amount subject to garnishment;
different tests are applied, on percentage of 60%, based on whether
head of family, number of months during which wages were earned,
amount of wages earned, with further provision for additional exemp-
tions allowed for each child under 18 years of age or other person
dependent upon debtor for support)
Wyoming 2 earned within 60 days
As is evident from the most cursory glance, the lack of uniformity among
the state wage exemption provisions is their most outstanding feature.
EXEMPTIONS UNDER MISSOURI STATUTES
The Missouri exemptions in which we are here interested are embodied
within five sections, three of which compel but brief mention as they per-
[Vol. 12
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tain only to personal property exempt to one not the head of a family, 34
property which the head of a family may select in lieu of other personal
property as exempt, 35 and wage exemptions for heads of families.36 The two
most important exemptions are those dealing with the homestead and with
the personal property exemptions for heads of families. The former statute
is as follows: 37
"The homestead of every housekeeper or head of a family,
consisting of a dwelling house and appurtenances, and the land used
in connection therewith, not exceeding the amount and value
herein limited, which is or shall be used by such housekeeper or head
of a family as such homestead, shall, together with the rents, issues
and products thereof, be exempt from attachment and execution,
except as herein provided; such homestead in the country shall not
include more than one hundred and sixty acres of land, or exceed
the total value of fifteen hundred dollars; and in cities having a
population of forty thousand or more, such homestead shall not
include more than eighteen square rods of ground, or exceed the
total value of three thousand dollars; and in cities having a popu-
lation of ten thousand and less than forty thousand, such homestead
shall not include more than thirty square rods of ground, or exceed
the total value of fifteen hundred dollars; and in cities and incor-
porated towns and villages having a population less than ten thous-
and, such homestead shall not include more than five acres of
ground, or exceed the total value of fifteen hundred dollars (all
preceding italics added The husband shall be debarred from and
incapable of selling, mortgaging or alienating the homestead in any
manner whatever, and every such sale, mortgage or alienation is
hereby declared null and void: Provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the husband
and wife from jointly conveying, mortgaging, alienating or in any
other manner disposing of such homestead, or any part thereof."
34. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1323: "The following property only shall be
exempt from attachment and execution, when owned by any person other than
the head of a family: First, the wearing apparel of all persons; second, the necessary
tools and implements of trade of any mechanic, whilst carrying on his trade."
35. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1327: "Each head of a family, at his election,
in lieu of the property mentioned in the first and second subdivision of section 1324
may select and hold, exempt from execution, any other property, real, personal or
mixed, or debts and wages, not exceeding in value the amount of three hundred
dollars, except ten per cent of any debt, income, salary or wages due such head
of a family."
36. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1562. "... nor shall any person be charged as
garnishee for more than ten per cent of any wages due from him to a defendant in
his employ for the last thirty days' service: Provided, such employee is the head
of a family and a resident of this state. ..
37. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 608.
1947]
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The personal property exemptions are set forth in the following manner:"s
"The following property, when owned by the head of the
family, shall be exempt from attachment and execution: First,
ten head of choice hogs, ten head of choice sheep, and the product
thereof in wool, yarn or cloth, two cows and calves, two plows, one
ax, one hoe and one set of plow gears, and all necessary farm im-
plements for the use of one man; second, two work animals, and
feed of the value of twenty-five dollars for the stock above exempted;
third, the spinning wheels and cards, one loom and apparatus,
necessary for manufacturing cloth in a private family; fourth, all
the spun yarn, thread and cloth manufactured for family use;
fifth, any quantity of hemp, flax and wool, not exceeding twenty-
five pounds each; sixth, all wearing apparel of the family, four beds
with usual bedding, and such other household and kitchen furniture,
not exceeding the value of one hundred dollars, as may be necessary
for the family ... ; seventh., the necessary tools and implements of
trade of any mechanic while carrying on his trade; eighth, any and
all arms and military equipments required by law to be kept;
ninth, all such provisions as may be on hand for family use, not
exceeding one hundred dollars in value; tenth, the Bibles and other
books used in a family, lettered gravestones, and one pew in a house
of worship; eleventh., all lawyers, physicians, ministers of the gospel,
and teachers, in the actual prosecution of their calling, shall have
the privilege of selecting such books as shall be necessary to their
profession, in the place of other property herein allowed, at their
option; and doctors of medicine, in lieu of other property exempt
from execution, may be allowed to select from their medicines." (all
italics added)
The "homestead" is a purely statutory estate,"0 and being remedial,
but not in derogation of the common law,40 has been liberally construed. 4'
It has been held, however, that this liberal construction ". . . should not
extend beyond the plain purpose of their enactment as evidencedi by the
usual and obvious meaning of the words employed or dispense with the
necessity of parties bringing themselves within the spirit and purpose of
38. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1324.
39. Stanton v. Leonard, 344 Mo. 998, 130 S. W. (2d) 487 (1939).
40. Sperry v. Cook, 247 Mo. 132, 135, 152 S. W. 318, 319 (1912) saying, "It
also assists us if we bear in mind that these statutes are not in derogation of the
common law, and the homestead statute sare simply restrictive of the innovation
.. for, by the common law a.man could only have satisfaction of the goods, chat-
tels, and the present profits of land, . . . but not the possession of the lands them-
selves."' Brewington v. Brewington, 211 Mo. 48, 109 S. W. 723 (1908).
41. Brennecke v. Riemann, 102 S. W. (2d) 874, 109 A. L. R. 1214 (Mo.,
1937); Keeline v. Sealy, 257 Mo. 498, 165 S. W. 1088 (1914).
[Vol. 12
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1947], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/8
1947] HOMESTEAD, WAGE EXEMPTIONS 37
the laws unaided by judicial construction." 42 Only one homestead is allowed, 43
it requiring both ownership and occupancy,44 and the provisions of size and
value are, similarly to a few other states, co-limiting. 45 Although the home-
stead is not exempt from debts incurred prior to its acquisition," nor from
tax payments,47 yet concerning debts incurred subsequent to its acquisition
the homestead may be conveyed free from the claims of the vendor's credit-
ors, 48 and the vendor may invest the proceeds of his sale in another home-
stead, the exemption carrying over from the first into the second home-
stead.49 It is specifically provided that the husband and wife may jointly
mortgage the homestead, 50 and the exemption right may be lost by abandon-
ment; 51 yet any attempted conveyance of, or contract to convey,5 2 all or
part of the homestead by the husband alone is void not only as to the wife
and children but also as to the husband.53
Turning then to the personal property exemptions, again it is found
that "while a liberal interpretation is always to be indulged in construing
42. Regan v. Ensley, 283 Mo. 297, 303, 222 S. W. 773 (1920).
43. Scheerer v. Scheerer, 287 Mo. 229 S. W. 192 (1921); Notes (1940) 128
A. L. R. 1431 (multiple dwelling house part of which is occupied by owner as sub-
ject of homestead), (1938) 114 A. L. R. 209 (use of property for business as well
as residence purposes), (1931) 73 A. L. R. 116 (inclusion of different tracts or
parcels in homesteads).
44. Rouse v. Caton, 168 Mo. 288, 67 S. W. 578, 67 S. W. 578, 90 Am. St. Rep.
456 (1902); although as to whether it is sufficient if the tracts of land are contiguous
compare Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229, 12 S. W. 792 (1889) with Overfield v.
Overfield, 326 Mo. 83, 30 S. W. (2d) 1073 (1930).
45. Acreback v. Myer, 165 Mo. 685, 65 S. W. 1015 (1901).
46. Shipman v. Fitzpatrick, 350 Mo. 118, 164 S. W. (2d) 912 (1942); Stivers
v. Home, 62 Mo. 473 (1876).
47. Robinson v. Levy, 217 Mo. 498, 117 S. W. 577 (1909).
48. Kendall v. Powers, 96 Mo. 142, 8 S. W. 793, 9 Am. St. Rep. 326 (1888).
49. New Madrid Banking Co. v. Brown, 165 Mo. 32, 65 S. NV. 297 (1901).
However, if the proceeds of the sale are not, within a reasonable length of time,
invested in another homestead, then the proceeds are no longer exempt; note (1935)
50 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 58, 60, citing Osborne &' Co. v. Evans, 185 Mo. 509,
84 S. W. 867 (1904).
50. Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229, 12 S. W. 792 (1889). Notes (1939) 4
Mo. LAW REv. 73 (discussing a wife's privilege to claim homestead in an estate
by the entirety) and (1914) 3 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 33 (discussing the wife's
homestead rights existent after the husband's death).
51. Klotz v. Rhodes, 240 Mo. 499, 144 S. W. 791 (1912). However, the owner
of a homestead who rents it temporarily and occupies a rented house elsewhere
does not thereby forfeit his homestead right, Spratt v. Early, 169 Mo. 357, 69 S. W.
13 (1902). And though this personal privilege of exemption may be waived, Parke-
ton v. Pugsley, 142 Mo. App. 537, 121 S. W. 789 (1909), it is not essential for the
debtor to specify the section of the statute under which he claims his exemptions,
Rolla State Bank v. Borgfield, 93 Mo. App. 62 (1902).
52. Gum v. Wolfinbarger, 338 Mo. 968, 93 S. W. (2d) 667 (1936).
53. Haines v. Carroll, 327 Mo. 1026, 38 S. W. (2d) 1047 (1931); note (1941)
130 A. L. R. 1028 (enforcement of claim for alimony against exemptions).
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(these statutes) . . . for the benefit of families, and what is within the
plain meaning and implication of such statutes is as much a part of them
as its strict letter, yet these rules of interpretation are also wholly ineffectual
to strike out the letter of an act, or to work their destruction, when they are
plain and unambiguous."'54 Partnership assets cannot be included among the
personalty exemption. 5 Generalized statements are not so applicable to
the personalty exemptions as they are to the above homestead exemptions,
because the Missouri statute is of the type consisting mainly of a listing of
specified articles of personal property-the problem thus being limited
primarily to the interpretation of certain phrases as "necessary farm im-
plements," "work animals," "necessary tools and implements," or "books
as are necessary."
Having seen the phraseology of these provisions and the approach of the
courts, further consideration should be given to the present applicability of
the statutes. Missouri is among -those states which differentiate between
homestead in the country and in the city, the Missouri statute having
done so at and since its original passage in 1865. Only minor changes in
the original statute have been made, these pertaining to the wife's re-
cordation of the homestead-with the later omission of such proceedinglo-
and to a change in the area and value of certain city homesteadsA7 Thus
essentially the homestead exemption of 1865 must be the same as that of
today; but is it? Though without intent to slight correlative economic factors
resort must be had to the property valuations, where available, of the
property during the period when the exemption laws were passed.
In view of the fact that, in the Missouri homestead exemption, the
restrictions on size and value are co-limiting, the assumption may be made
that when the provisions were passed the following were the usual valuations,
of the land together with the dwelling house and appurtenances: in the
country, $9.375 an acre; in cities having 40,000 or more population, $166.666
per square rod or per 11.25% of an acre; in cities having 10,000 but less than
40,000 population, $50 per square rod or per 18.75%o of an acre; and in cities
having less than 10,000 population, $300 an acre. However, it is at once
54. Payne v. Fraley, 165 Mo. 191, 196, 65 S. W. 292 (1901); Caldwell v.
Renfro, 99 Mo. App. 376, 73 S. W. 340 (1903).
55. State ex rel. Billingsley v. Spencer, 64 Mo. 355, 27 Am. Rep. 244 (1877).
56. Inserted by Mo. Laws, 1873, p. 16 and then changed by Mo. Laws, 1895,
p. 185.
57. The section was put into its present wording, concerning size and value
of homesteads, by Mo. Laws, 1881, p. 139.
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apparent that such classification is worthwhile only concerning the country
property, the unit of measure used concerning city property being too large.
Therefore, the consideration of the city valuations, as limited by the statute,
must be in regard only to the monetary limitations of $3,000 in cities of
40,000 or more population and $1,500 in cities of less than 40,000 popu,
lation; and it must be assumed that these valuations express the then
average value of homes with the land owned by those entitled to the home-
stead exemption. Because of the absence of more accurate data, the task
of securing which is beyond the scope of this study,18 two factors must be
mentioned generally: (a) unquestionably there has been a constant rise
in the value of city and town residential property, due to population growth,
business expansion, higher standards of living and other recognized elements,
but we are without the benefit of any comprehensive state wide surveys of
this matter, absent which no accurate conclusions can be reached; and,
(b) regarding those few statistics following, the figures do not distinguish
between property which may fall within the homestead exemption require-
ments and property which may be owned by persons not entitled to this
exemption. True, the number of persons concerned in the latter group
might be relatively small, but there can be no certainty, without com-
prehensive research, that the value of the property held by these persons
would not substantially affect any purported "average value" figure.
As presented in the FIFTEENTH CENSUS,59 1930, the median value
of owned nonfarm homes in Missouri was for the State-$4,050, for urban
homes-$5,104, for rural-nonfarm homes-$2,178, for Kansas City-$5,671,
and for St. Louis-$6,456. According to the next census in 1940,60 the
values had decreased to the following: for urban homes-$3,005, for rural
non-farm homes-$1,316, for Kansas City-$3,085, and for St. Louis-
$3,590. No sources were discovered which contained the alleged values of
residential properties for the present; yet it will be readily apparent that
58. Material dealing with early urban land values seems limited to studies
within a very few of the largest cities in the country; one of the best of these
is Hoyr, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO (1st ed., 1933) in
which the author listed, Appendix II, p. 460, the main methods employed in de-
termining the value of Chicago realty as being: assessments for taxation purposes,
advertised or listed prices in brokers' offices, appraisals and opinions of experts, and
actual sales or market prices. An interesting pamphlet, Catalogue of Missouri Lands,
published in 1865 by a Missouri real estate agency, Allen P. Richardson & Co., lists
the offering prices and descriptions for numerous tracts of realty in practically all
of the counties in the state.
59. FIvtEENTH CENSUS (1930) Population, Vol. VI, Table 8, p. 730.
60. SIXTEENrH CENSUS (1940) Housing, Vol. II, Part 3, Table 17, p. 883.
19471
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any listing of present valuations would be worthless because of the highly
inflationary conditions existing generally and specifically with regard to
residences. However, in comparing only the values set forth above with
those mentioned in the statute, it appears that the question is worthy of
legislative investigation if the purposes for, and the persons to be benefitted
by, the homestead exemptions are still substantially the same.
Due at least in part to the importance of agriculture in the development
of our country, statistics are available which prove the continued rise in the
value of farm properties, the fluctuation of which values are interesting as
reflecting national conditions. Table I shows the national rise, Table II
indicates the regional rise, and Table III reflects the trend in Missouri.
TABLE I1I1
Value of Specified Classes of Farm Property in the United States: 1850 to
1940 (Land and Buildings)
Year Per farm (average) Per acre (average)













Average Value & Index Number of all Farm Real Estate (Land and
Buildings) by Geographic Divisions: 1850 to 1930 West North Central











61. SIxTEEN CENSUS (1940) Agriculture, Vol. III, Table 5, p. 35.
62. FIFTEENTH CENSUS (1930) Agriculture, Farm Real Estate Values in tihe
[Vol. 12
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1947], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/8
1947] HOMESTEAD, WAGE EXEMPTIONS 41
TABLE II13
Average Value of Farm Land and Other Property in Missouri: 1850
to 1910
Year Acreage value per farm Average value per acre
All farm prop. Land & bldg. All farm prop. Land & bldg.
1910 $7,405 $6,190 $59.35 $49.61
1900 3,626 2,963 30.39 24.82
1890 3,304 2,629 25.55 20.33
1880 2,271 1,742 17.56 13.47
1870 2,658 2,119 18.16 14.48
1860 3,158 2,485 14.65 11.54
1850 1,599 1,161 8.95 6.50
The difference in values between the respective columns represents the value
of implements, livestock, and machinery, which categories will be considered
in connection with the personal property valuations.
In supplementing Table III by reference to the last census, 64 computa-
tions indicate that in 1940 the average value of Missouri farm property, land
and buildings only, was $4,324, the average value per acre being $31.87-
although with the actual values varying from $9.03 in Ozark county to
$74.88 in Clay County, exclusive of the outstanding valuations, which of
course really distort the state average, of $1,264.92 in St. Louis City, of
$224.12 in St. Louis County, and of $111.85 in Jackson County.65 Unless
the following ratio can be disregarded because of other economic bases, in
comparing the previously estimated value of $9.375 per acre, of the country
property in 1865, with the 1940 average value of $31.87 per acre, it seems
undeniable that our 1865 homestead exemption statute can no longer ade-
quately fulfill the objects for which it was originally intended.
Proceeding next to the Missouri exemptions of personal property, it
is believed that several portions of the provision may be disposed of by
mention. The third, fourth, and fifth subsections can be of value to only an
infinitely small percentage of the Missouri residents-these sections dealing
New England States, Table 2, p. 17. "West North Central" includes the states of
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas;
for the "Index Number" the year 1910 is the base 100%.
63. THIRTEENTH CENSUS (1910) Agriculture, Vol. V, Table 34, p. 93; see also
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1942) Table 648, p. 694.
64. SIXTEENTH CENSUS (1940) Agriculture, Vol. I, County Table I, p. 244
et seq.
65. See also the values imposed by the State Tax Commission, June 1, 1943,
submitted in the Fourteenth Biennial Report of the Missouri State Tax Commission
for the Years 1943-1944, p. 41-44.
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with the spinning wheels, cards and looms necessary for manufacturing
cloth, spun yarn, and twenty-five pounds of hemp, flax and wool. The eighth
subsection, pertaining to arms and military equipments required by law to
be kept, is of value, if any, only to some governmental agencies and then
in but a very indirect manner. The ninth subsection, permitting the exemp-
tion of $100 worth of provisions, is of course not so effective as when it was
passed, but any linitation on these goods if expressed in terms of money
value seems undesirable; instead, as set forth in some states, why not exempt
provisions necessary for a specified number of months, or, all provisions then
on band? The tenth subsection, exempting the Bibles and other books used
in a family, lettered gravestones, and one pew in a house of worship, is not
open to serious criticism, except that collections of rare books might well
be specifically non-exempt. Parts of the remaining subsections appear to be
presently ineffective, and these will be considered individually. Prior to this
consideration, however, it should be noted that, in addition to the item of
flexibility of context of certain phrases and of the values of enumerated
articles, the varied meanings and possibly increased values are important
to lawyers, physicians, ministers of the gospel, and teachers because of the
wording of the eleventh subsection which makes the essential part of their
exemption dependent upon, in the words of the statute, "other property
herein allowed."
The sixth subsection, exempting family wearing apparel, four beds and
usual bedding, and "such other household and kitchen furniture, not exceed-
ing the value oF $100, as may be necessary for the family," in its third
phrase clearly indicates the need for statutory revision. Although it is
realized that the following nineteenth century prices are but rough estima-
tions of the then existing retail prices, even this data could be secured only
by reference to the probate court records-this source being a factor to be
remembered in considering the comparative values. In one appraisal' during
July, 1859, twelve chairs were valued at $12, one arm chair at $2.50, one
small table at $4, one easy chair at $10, one bureau at $10, one lounge at $4,
four other chairs at $40; another appraisal" during November, 1859, listed
one bookcase and bureau at $25, one rocking chair at $2.50, one stove and
family room furniture at $18, one hair seat rocking chair at $8, one drawer
table at $1, one parlour stove and fixtures at $12; and in a sale 8 in 1844,
66. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of James S. Thomas, No. 1641.
67. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of James H. Parker, No. 1672.
68. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of Francis Rogers, No. 401.
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one writing desk sold for $5, one dressing table for $3, one bureau for $5,
and one book case for $3. Assuming that these figures are fairly indicative
of the prices at that time, the statutory limitation of $100 on household
and kitchen furniture may originally have been quite suitable. (The $100
limitation was substituted in 1855 for the first limitation of $25 in 1825)
However, let us then compare with the above some of the average prices
of household furniture during the 1940-1942 period; 9 the following quotations
were given by merchants as being an approximate figure for the average
priced product of standard make. A dining room table was said to sell for
$39, a writing desk for $40, a chair for $39.50, a rug for $40, a bureau for
$40, a davenport for $139.50, a seven-foot-box refrigerator for $175, a stove
for $98. It is hastily granted that no sound generalized conclusions can be
drawn from such limited data; yet it is submitted that the facts at least
show a need for legislative consideration.
The first, second, and seventh subsections are objectionable because
their provisions, which pertain to farmers and mechanics, are so phrased
that they have been dependent upon judicial construction, for the most
part, for their scope of application. These subsections being faulty, the
inevitable outcome is that the eleventh subsection, pertaining to lawyers,
physicians, ministers and teachers, is also faulty, because the exemption
granted by the latter is governed by the scope' of exemptions granted in
the former. In other words, as the construed effect of these provisions has
been to limit the farmer's exemption practically to those implements used
when the statute was passed, the doctor's exemption has then been limited
to the value of the farmer's exemption; and, even assuming that the monetary
value of both types of exemption should be approximately the same, the
features remain that the latter is dependent upon the former, and the
former either is subject to the unbridled whims of a jury or is already limited
by stare decisis. Certainly the implements necessary to a farmer will vary
throughout the state because of the various types of farming and farming
problems,70 but that should not require that the value of the lawyer's or
doctor's exemption must likewise vary. It should be noted that one case 71
69. The present 1946 prices were not used because of their clearly being dis-
proportionately excessive with regard to their true economic value.
70. As suggested in 25 C. J. 55, ". . . the conflict of opinion being accounted
for undoubtedly, quite as much by the varying farming methods and practices in
different parts of the country, as by the phrasing of the statutes."
71. Brown v. Hoffmeister, 71 Mo. 411, 413 (1880) stating, "We think it a far
more reasonable construction of the statute to hold that, while a lawyer may select
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seems to say that the doctors' and lawyers', et cetera, exemption of books
and medicines is really "in lieu" of specified exemptions of the spinning
wheels, loom, yarn, hemp, wearing apparel, beds and bedding, and the
household furniture. This does not appear correct, however, because the
statute apparently grants specified exemptions to all heads of families, and
then includes specific provisions as to farmers, mechanics, and those fol-
lowing professions.
The problem being similar in regard to the provisions affecting both-
farmers and mechanics, any conclusions as to one group is applicable to the
other. This problem is founded on the ambiguity of the phrases, respectively,
"all necessary farm implements for the use of one man" and "the necessary
tools and implements of trade of any mechanic." As undoubtedly the vast
majority of instances where exemptions were claimed were not cases which
ever reached our appellate courts, we are without substantial judicial guid-
ance as to whether or not in actual practice this ambiguity under present
day living tends to 'defeat the original statutory purposes; yet as noted
above,7 2 in several jurisdictions, where statutory phraseology permits-as
it does also in the Missouri provisions, there is a tendency to limit the
exemption granted by these phrases to inexpensive hand tools and im-
plements. Instead of there being leeway in the statute for any such tendency,
the legislative intent should be clearly stated.
The early agriculture of this country was largely a pioneer woodland
agriculture,7 and in the earlier half of the nineteenth century the farmer
depended mostly on simple hand tools;74 thus it is understandable that some
courts would take the view that the statute should be interpreted in the
light of the conditions then existent. However, "after the Civil War, shortage
of labor supply and the rapid development of agriculture in the prairie
regions resulted in an increased demand for labor saving machinery and a
such books as may be necessary to his profession, yet as such books are to be
selected 'in the place of other property,' which the same section previously exempts,
the books should not exceed in value 'other property' in lieu of which the books
may be selected; in short, that the mere option of the debtor should not enlarge
his exemptions under the law."
72. See footnote 24 supra. Further, "in keeping with the construction given
by some courts to the word 'tools' as extending only to such tools as are used by
hand, farming tools would include hoes, axes, pitchforks, shovels, spades, scythes,
and other articles of that character, but not machinery or implemetns drawn by
animals or heavy complicated devices . . . ," 22 Air. JUR., Exemptions. § 42.
73. ROGIN, THE INTRODUCTION OF FARM MAcHINERY (1931), p. 14.
74. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Causes of High Prices
on Far mlmplements (May 4, 1920), p. 45.
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marked improvement in agricultural implements." 75 Even if the court, with-
out legislative action, were to decide that it would be permissible for the
farmer to have exempt a very expensive farm tractor, this would not solve
the problem. "Mechanization of the farm involves more than the purchase
of a tractor. It practically calls for a reorganization of the farm on a dif-
ferent scale, the acquisition of new and a higher degree of planning. It also
involves a higher capital investment and a greater dependence of the farm
on credit resources and manufactured products in the form of power units,
parts and fuel. Commercial farmers who are not in a position to mechanize
face increasing difficulties resulting from competition of the- mechanized
farms. ' ' 71 As summarized by the latest census, 77 the value of agricultural
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For estimated values of farm implements as shown by probate appraisals'
one set of values registered during November, 182178 were four weeding
hoes for $3.50, one bare shear plow $6.50, one pair single trees $2, one
pitchfork $.75, three falling axes $6, three clevizes and twisted link $2.50, one
claw hammer $.50, one pair sheep shears $.75, one horse plow $5, one hand
75. Ibid.
76. McKibben and Griffen, Changes in Farin, Power and Equipment-Trac-
tors, Trucks and Automobiles, WPA National Research Project, Report No. A-9
(December, 1938) p. XIII.
77. SIXTEENTH CENSUS (1940) Agriculture, Vol. III, Table 5, p. 35. See also
Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Causes of High Prices on Farm
Implements (May 4, 1920) Table 6, p. 44, and, McKibben and Griffen, op. cit. supra
note 76, at p. 5.
78. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of James Beattie, No. 12.
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saw $1.75, one crosscut saw $9; and, during August, 1859"M two ploughs were
appraised at $9. Among other appraisals during 1859, one 0 in September
listed four weeding hoes for $1.50, one hay rake for $5, one log chain and
iron hooks $1, two cultivators $5, one dirt scraper $3, two pair plough gear
$5, one straw cutter $.75, one bathing trough $3, two 2-horse ploughs and
double trees $15, and, during June, 1866, another plough was valued at
$10.81 Going from those valuations to retail prices existing during 1940-1942
the changes in terminology and price are self-evident, with an 18-inch disc
harrow selling for $185, a cultivator for $130, a combine for $775, a corn
middle-buster for $287.15, a small five foot mowing machine for $116, a side
delivery rake for $138.50, a pick up baler for $1200. Absent any contention
that, for example, an expensive baler should always be included among the
exemptions, it does seem clear that sufficient progress has occurred to
warrant conjunctive statutory progress through official research and de-
liberation.
OTHER FACTORS AND CONCLUSION
The assumption that the original purposes of the exemption laws still
exist has been noticed throughout the discussion. However, concerning the
homestead exemption one writer suggested, "it may be that the social needs
served by the homestead exemption movement.., have become less urgent
and universal, in view of the changing status of the family, and the revolution
which has taken place in the habit of home ownership. Homestead exemption
laws serve little purpose in great cities where most housing is rented; it seems
safe to predict that whatever utility such legislation will have in the future
will be restricted largely to agricultural regions.1'82 Similarly, with reference
to the personal property exemptions, it is the view of another that "it may
fairly be said that laws creating exemptions to a large extent have defeated
their purpose. They have tended to make credit of more than nominal pro-
portions dependent upon security. So far as the taking of security in general
improves the safety of credit, it may be an advance in business methods; but
79. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of David Todd, No. 1649. As shown
also by these probate records, it must be remembered that the use of slaves played
a large part in the earlier farming methods in Missouri.
80. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of William H. Hudson, No. 1641.
81. Boone County Probate Court, Estate of Jonathan Amerine, No. 1663.
82. Note, State Homestead Exemption Laws (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1023, 1040.
Possibly ". . . we should allow the family which does not own a home larger exemp-
tions of other kinds-a rent exemption, for instance," Lewis, Principles of Exemp-
tion Laws (1928) 2 DAK. L. REv. 140, 142.
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when, as with the small farmer or laborer, it results in mortgaging the neces-
sities of life, the means of family protection, the articles which should be
exempt if anything should be exempt, it partially- destroys the effect
of exemption laws and invalidates the exemption principle. In practice, it
also gives a preference to certain kinds of business, those which can more
easily and feasibly take security. The bank and the farm machinery house
take security, the retail merchant does not."83 And further, "the exemption
of tools of a trade has to a large extent outlined its usefulness.... The amount
of capital today required in various occupations is too great to make its
exemption as tools of trade desirable without such a strict limit.
' '84
It cannot be disputed that a wide spread use of credit has become a
business necessity as well as convenience. With reference to agriculture,
"the average value of a farm, land and buildings, in the United States in 1940
was (approximately) $5,500, which was low compared to the 1930 average
of $7,600 or the 1920 average of $10,300. "Even though a farmer has the
initial investment of $5,500 to purchase the farm without using credit, he
still has the task of accumulating the working capital, equipment and live-
stock needed to operate the farm. Investment in livestock and equipment
averages approximately one-fourth the land and building total. A rough
estimate for an average farm would be $500 for machinery and implements,
$800 for livestock, and $200 for working capital, a total of $1,500. To avoid
credit, therefore, accumulated savings of $7,000 would be required.... The
farm laborer in 1941, with a monthly wage of $40, might well consider farm
ownership impossible without credit, and might wonder about the prob-
ability of becoming even a tenant without the use of credit."' In view of
these statements one possible approach is that, as the use of credit is in-
dispensable in any event, and as the exemption laws would not include
the necessary expensive equipment, therefore the exemption laws should be
eliminated as surplusage.
Also to be considered is the effect of the Federal Farm Loan Act,8 6 be-
cause "for the period September 1, 1935, through March 31, 1941, 150,644
83. Lewis, supra note 82, at 141.
84. Id. at 145.
85. MURRAY, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE (1941) 5.
86. 12 U. S. C. A. § 1016; note (1943) 147 A. L. R. 743, 744 stating, "The
beneficient purpose of loans under the Federal Farm Loan Act is to enable farmers
who are in debt, and without ability to make payment, to constitute the Federal
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individual cases were handled involving indebtedness totaling 453 million
dollars prior to the adjustment. In the process of adjustment. 100 million
dollars of debts were cancelled. In most cases new loans were obtained as
a part of the adjustment procedure. 87 The effectiveness of this program,
however, has been questioned on the following grounds: "There is danger
of credit being extended on too generously a scale; politics and farm credit
do not mix well; the prospects of governmental farm credit reducing tenancy
seem none too bright; the difficulties introduced by rising land values suggest
the central problem in farm credit, fluctuations in the price level-without
stability a large element of uncertainty is sure to exist concerning the
success of governmental agencies in assisting tenants into ownership. '' 88
Our Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law8" has a basic concept
very similar to the principles of the exemption laws, the statement of the
public policy saying that "Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a
serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state
resulting in a public calamity." Yet this certainly does not have the effect
of replacing the exemption law because its purposes are limited to "increasing
opportunities for placements" and "providing for the payment of compen-
sation." Further, the spirit of the bankruptcy Act90 directly embraces the
application of the exemption laws; as stated by the United States Supreme
Court, "it is the two fold purpose of the bankruptcy act to convert the estate
of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors, and then to
give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute
left untouched."'91 The rights of a bankrupt to property are those given to
him by the state statutes, and if such exempt property is not subject to levy
and sale under those statutes then it cannot be made to respond under the
act of Congress. 92
Despite the often required use of credit and regardless of the incidental
benefits to debtors derived from other forms of legislation, it must be remem-
87. MURRAY, op. cit. supra note 85, at 298.
88. Id. at 316. See also notes (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1467, 1476 and (1935)
99 A. L. R. 1378.
89. Mo. REV. STAr. (1939) § 9422.
90. 11 U. S. C. A. § 24: "This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by
the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wh'erein
they have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition, or for a olnger portion of such months than in any other State. .. "
91. Burlington v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 33 S. Ct. 564, 57 L. ed. 920, 46
L. R. A. (NS) 148 (1913).
92. Smalley v. Laugenour, 196 U. S. 93, 25 S. Ct. 216, 49 L. ed. 400 (1905).
[Vol. 12
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1947], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/8
1947] HOMESTEAD, WAGE EXEMPTIONS 49
bered that "since the beginning of the century there have been 546,000 com-
mercial failures involving liabilities of $10,818,000,000. Since 1919 the annual
number has steadily risen from 6,451 with liabilities of $113,291,000 to
28,285 failures with liabilities of $736,310,000 in 1931. In 1932, commercial
failures reached the record-breaking total of 31,822, with liabilities of
$928,313,000."'9 Yet with possibly another record-breaking period of com-
mercial failures in the offing, no other form of legislation has been presented
as supplanting the exemption laws; rather, various forms of legislation, if
not expressly recognizing the exemption provisions, may be said to impliedly
presume the continued existence of such exemptions in some form. From
these factors at least one conclusion could be that there is a present neces-
sity for the application of the original exemption purposes.
Any study of this problem leads to the following questions: "(1) what
are the actual needs of the debtor today, as contrasted with his needs when
the present exemption laws were enacted? (2) Can those needs be pro-
vided for without a complete revision . . . of our statutes? (3) Is there
lacking in the present form of the statutes that symmetry and balance be-
tween the policy of the state in protecting the debtor from subjection to
absolute want, and the right of the creditor to the collection of his claim?" 4
In other words, are the provisions of our exemption statutes operating in
,all-around fairness? Any conclusive answers to these questions cannot, of
course, be summarily given. However, it is submitted that even the general
indications of our very substantial economic evolution are sufficient to direct,
if not to compel, legislative attention toward the remedial action requisite
to insure against further usage of seemingly outmoded standards and un-
desirable phraseology.
93. EPSTEIN, INSECURiTY-A CHALLENGE TO AMERICA (2d rev. ed., 1938) 13.
94. Note (1935) 10 Wisc. L. REv. 277, 278.
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